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through excessive penalties from testing its validity, is unconstitutional on
its face, as it amounts to a denial of due process.8 Although the valiidty
of this penal provision is highly doubtful, the court could not consider it,
as this was a civil action.
M. J. G.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-SUIT BY INSURER TO DETERmINE THE EXTENT
OF LABILITY AS "CASE AND CONTROVERSY."--[Federal].-The Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals in adjudicating its first declaratory judgment case' has
chosen to take a conservative view of the function of declaratory proceed-
ings. The decision was rendered in a suit brought under the Federal De-
claratory Judgments Act 2 by an insurance company against an insured to
have the court render a declaratory judgment that the policy had lapsed
for non-payment of premiums because the insured was not so disabled as to
relieve him from further payments within the terms of the policy. In pray-
ing for a declaratory decree the petitioner pointed out that 1) the insured
has not instituted any action wherein the petitioner could prove the absence
of disabilities of the insured, 2) that the action on the policy will not be
barred until after the running of the Statute of Limitations following the
death of the insured, and 3) that because permanent disability has not been
judicially determined the petitioner is compelled annually to set aside and
maintain substantial reserves upon the policies. The court, with one judge
dissenting, afflrmed the decision of the lower court,8 holding that the facts
alleged failed to present an "actual controversy" in that it did not show that
any right of the petitioner was being invaded or prejudicially affected by
the alleged acts of the defendant.
The validity of declaratory actions is now well established,4 and it is
only its applicability to particular fact situations which gives rise to con-
flicting decisions.5 Judges who are hostile toward any innovation bearing
upon the exercise of the judicial power have been inclined to find that the
facts sought to be determined do not present an "actual controversy"0 with-
in the meaning of Article III.7
31. Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 52 L. ed. 714 (1908);
Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 325, 337, 40 S. Ct. 338, 64 L. ed.
598 (1919).
1. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth et al, 84 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A.
8, 1936).
2. 48 Stat. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 400 (1934).
3. 11 F. Supp. 1016 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1935).
4. In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 At. 265 (1925); Miller v.
Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1923); Nashville, etc. Ry. v. Wallace,
288 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed. 730, 87 A. L. R. 1191 (1933).
5. With the instant case compare New York Life Insurance Co. v. Lon-
don, 15 F. Supp. 586 (D. C. D. Mass., 1936), Travelers Ins. Co. v. Helmer,
15 F. Supp. 355 (D. C. D. Ga., 1936).
6. The opening phrase of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, "In
cases of actual controversy" owes its origin to the since overruled decision
of the Michigan Supreme Court in Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211
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The problem presented by the instant case is whether a suit brought by
an insurer against an insured, who is asserting rights which are being de-
nied by the insurer, presents a justiciable controversy. While there are
contrary holdings, there is convincing authority permitting declaratory
decrees in a suit brought by the party charged against the claiming party
for a declaration that he is not liable as claimed, and is through breach of
the claimant released from further obligation to him.9 These cases recog-
nize that the real controversy is as to the extent of the insurer's liability.
Insurance contracts are peculiarly susceptible to effective adjudications
by declaration.O To hold, as did one court,"1 that a declaratory decree can
only be rendered at the instance of the person claiming the right and in-
tending to assert it, is to defeat the very purpose of the act-to determine
the jural relations of parties although under the conventional procedure the
Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920). This provision expressly forecloses against
the assumption that the Act directed the rendering of advisory opinions,
as in Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U. S. 346 (1911). See Borchard, The Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act (1934) 21 Va. L. Rev. 35, 44. The Uniform Act,
adopted in the large majority of the states (See Laws of Mo. 1935 p. 218),
does not include this phrase but the cases are legion in requiring the ex-
istence of an "actual controversy" as a prerequisite to a declaratory decree.
See cases cited in note 38 of Note, Declaratory Judgments With Recent
Missouri Developments (1935) 21 ST. Louis LAw REv. 49.
7. U. S. Const. Art. III, sec. 2: "The Judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases .... ; to Controversies . . . ."; See generally Borchard, Declaratory
Judgments (1934) 29 and 35; Schroth, The "Actual Controversy" in De-
claratory Actions (1934) 20 Cornell L. Q. 1; Note, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 232
(1927).
8. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bellos, 158 Tenn. 554, 13 S. W. (2d) 795 (1929)
reh. denied, 158 Tenn. 562, 14 S. W. (2d) 961; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Rich-
mond, 107 Conn. 117, 139 Atl. 702 (1927).
9. New York Life Ins. Co. v. London, 15 F. Supp. 586 (D. C. D. Mass.,
1936) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Helmer, 15 F. Supp. 355 (D. C. D. Ga., 1936) ;
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hearn, 170 So. 59 (Ala., 1936); Utica
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Glennie, 230 N. Y. Supp. 673 (1928) ; Ohio Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (D. C. S. D. Tex., 1935); Commercial
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 13 F. Supp. 174 (D. C. S. D. Tex., 1935) ;
Merchant's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Pinard, 183 Atl. 36 (N. H., 1936);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co., (C. A.) 2 K. B. 536 (1915): "A
declaration that a person is not liable to an existing or possible action is
one which will hardly ever be made though it is not beyond the power of
the court to make such a declaration."
10. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1934) 490, where this statement
is supported by the reasoning that 1) many questions of validity are likely
to arise before the loss insured against occurs, and 2) insurance companies
are usually responsible concerns and a declaration against them is equiva-
lent to a judgment for damages.
11. Columbia National Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 13 F. Supp. 350 (D. C.
W. D. Mo., 1936). Declaratory judgments were rendered in suits brought
by the insured in the following cases: Frasch v. London, etc. Ins. Co., 213
Cal. 219, 2 P. (2d) 147 (1931); Malley v. American Indem. Corp., 297 Pa.
216, 146 Atl. 571 (1929) ; Post v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 237 N. Y.
Supp. 64 (1929), aff. 254 N. Y. 541, 173 N. E. 857 (1930); Seligman v.
Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Ch. 519 (1917).
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petitioner would have no cause of action.' 2 In fact, the declaratory pro-
cedure is the only recognized method by which an insurer can, of its own
motion, secure a determination of his liability or non-liability.18
The rendition of a declaratory judgment in the instant case would not
have circumvented any statutory policy of the state.74 Nor would it amount
to a determination of rights0 which were future, contingent and uncer-
tain.16 A declaratory decree, as the dissenting judge pointed out,' 7 would
have determined whether the legal relation of insurer and insured existed
betveen the parties to the suit, together with the attendant rights, duties
and privileges. Had the insured instituted the suit to reinstate the policy
a justiciable controversy would have been presented.18 The mere fact that
the suit was instituted by the insurer, and that the declaration in respect
to these conflicting rights would also determine the obligations of the in-
sured, should not oust the court of jurisdiction.19
There are four classifications of "case and controversies":20 1) where
rights have been impaired and damage incurred, 2) where injury is im-
pending, 3) where there has been no actual damage but merely a bona fide
dispute between parties who seek a determination so as to avoid acting at
their peril, and 4) moot cases and advisory opinions. The declaratory judg-
ment was designed to cover actions falling within the third classification.21
Since the Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to supply the need for a
procedure permitting the determination of controversies before they lead
to the repudiation of obligations, the invasion of rights and the commis-
sions of wrong,22 it is regrettable that narrow and technical constructions
are being resorted to-constructions which in effect are thwarting the
"benevolent purposes" of the Act.23
12. Glen Falls Indemnity Co. v. Keliher, 187 Atl. 473 (N. H., 1936);
London Assoc. of Shipbuilders v. London & India Dock Committee, 2 Ch.
242 (1892) ; Ellis v. Duke of Bedford, 1 Ch. 494, 515 (1899).
13. Glen Falls Indemnity Co. v. Keliher, supra, note 12.
14. That this would be a valid reason for refusing a declaratory decree
see Fisher Flouring Mills v. Vierhus, 78 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9, 1935);
Meridian Grain & Elevator Co. v. Fly, 12 F. Supp. 64 (D. C. S. D. Miss.,
1935).
15. See for example Ashwander v. T. V. A., 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct.
466, 80. L. ed. (adv.) 427 (1936).
16. Brix v. People's Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal. (2d) 446, 41 P. (2d)
537 (1935) ; Comment, 20 ST. Louis LAw REv. 278 (1935).
17. 84 F. (2d) 695, at p. 700.
18. Missouri Cattle Loan Co. v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 330 Mo. 988, 52
S. W. (2d) 1 (1932).
19. New York Life Ins. Co. v. London, 15 F. Supp. 586 (D. C. D. Mass.,
1936).
20. Note, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1351 (1936).
21. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Judiciary
on H. R. 5623, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) 47 et seq.
22. Note, 21 ST. Louis LAW RE V. 49, 74 (1935).
23. General purpose of declaratory judgments is to quiet and stabilize
uncertain or disputed jural relations either as to present or prospective
obligations. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. Supp.
288 (1936); James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401
(1931) ; Siegel v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 158 Atl. 891 (1932).
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
In equitable actions to quiet title or quid timet any claim or assertion
casting doubt upon the plaintiff's rights, sufficiently damages his material
interests to present a condition of justiciability.24 Logically, it would seem
to follow that where differences between parties have reached a point where
future litigation is inevitable, a sufficient controversy, justifying invoking
the declaratory procedure, is present.25
While it is yet too early to predict with assurance what scope the courts
will give to declaratory actions, an encouraging trend is discernible. 26 It is
submitted that the instant case unnecessarily curtails the use of the de-
claratory actions. It is definitely "out-of-line" with the more acceptable
decisions.27
W. F.
EVIDENCE--EXPERT WITNESSES-HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION-MODEL Ex-
PERT TESTIMONY AcT-[California].-In a suit to recover the reasonable
value of legal services, a hypothetical question was asked of an expert
witness by plaintiff. No objection was made to it then by defendant, but
on appeal he contended that it was error to allow the hypothetical question
because it omitted mention of certain letters that had a bearing on the
case. Held; the competency of a hypothetical question is not affected by
the fact that it does not contain all the facts bearing on the issue in the
case.1
Because of the abuses to which it has been subjected, the abolition of the
hypothetical question has been urged.2 The instant case is in accord with
the general rule.3 Being permitted to use as few facts as he desires in
framing his hypothetical question, a clever lawyer can often, by conceal-
ing the real significance of the evidence or by unduly emphasizing certain
data, mislead the jury.4 Furthermore, the opinion he obtains from the wit-
ness will be remembered by the jury, but the fact that it is based upon a
partial statement of the facts in the actual case will be forgotten.5 Cross
24. Guthery v. Ball, 206 Mo. App. 570, 228 S. W. 887 (1921) ; Walsh, On
Equity (1930) 541 et seq.
25. Sullivan & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Ideal Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 313 Pa. 407,
170 Atl. 263, 98 A. L. R. 1 (1934); Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 Atl.
675 (1930).
26. Note, The Declaratory Judgment and the Insurance Contract (1936)
46 Yale L. J. 286.
27. In a recent case almost identical with the facts of the instant case
the judge said, ". . . remedy by declaratory judgment seems to be of ideal
application to such a case." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Helmer, 15 F. Supp. 355,
356 (D. C. D. Ga., 1936).
1. Matthiesen v. Smith, 60 P. (2d) 873 (Cal., 1936).
2. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 686; 32 Am. L. Rev. 851
(1898).
3. 1 Wigmore, Ibid. sec. 682; 18 Ann. Cases 646 (1909).
4. Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S. W. 405 (1908).
5. Opp v. Pryor, 294 I1. 538, 128 N. E. 580 (1920).
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